Assistant Professor of Finance
Department of Finance and Economics
Office: Business Center 485
Phone: 410.837.4919
E-mail: dchen@ubalt.edu
Professor Chen joined the faculty in 2008 after earning his Ph.D. from Duke University. He has a research interest in the area of corporate governance and has published and presented in the subject worldwide.
Refereed Journal Articles
Chen, D. (2012). Classified Boards, the Cost of Debt, and Firm Performance. Journal of Banking and Finance. 36(12), 3346-3365.
Chen, D., & Bradley, M. (2011). Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions. Journal of Corporate Finance. 17(1), 83-107.
Chen, D., & Rose, M. Yes "Golden Parachutes, Takeover Probability, and Risk-Taking," Midwest Finance Association, Chicago, IL. (2013).
Chen, D. Yes "Classified Boards, the Cost of Debt, and Firm Performance," Financial Management Association, Denver, CO. (2011).
Chen, D. No Southern Finance Association 2010 Annual Meeting, Asheville, NC, USA. (2010).
Chen, D. Yes "Board Independence and Credit Ratings," Southern Finance Association, Asheville, NC. (2010).
Chen, D. Yes "Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions," Southern Finance Association, Asheville, NC. (2010).
Chen, D. Yes "Corporate Governance, Credit Condition, and the Cost of Debt," Southern Finance Association, Asheville, NC. (2010).
Chen, D. Yes "Corporate Governance, Credit Condition, and the Cost of Debt," Financial Management Association, New York City. (2010).
Chen, D. No Southwestern Finance Association 49th Annual Meeting, Dallas, TX, USA. (2010).
Chen, D., & Bradley, M. Yes "Board Independence and Credit Ratings," Southwestern Finance Association, Dallas, TX. (2010).
Chen, D. Yes "Board Independence and Credit Ratings," Financial Management Association, Reno, NV. (2009).
Chen, D. No Southern Finance Association 2008 Annual Meeting, Key West, FL, USA. (2008).
Chen, D., Bradley, M., Dallas, G., & Snyderwine, E. Yes "The Effects of Corporate Governance Attributes on Credit Ratings and Bond Yields," Southern Finance Association, Key West, FL. (2008).
Chen, D. Yes "The Monitoring and Advisory Functions of Corporate Boards: Theory and Evidence," Southern Finance Association, Key West, FL. (2008).
Chen, D., Bradley, M., Dallas, G., & Snyderwine, E. Yes "The Effects of Corporate Governance Attributes on Credit Ratings and Bond Yields," Financial Management Association, Grapevine (Dallas), TX. (2008).
Chen, D. Yes "The Monitoring and Advisory Functions of Corporate Boards: Theory and Evidence," Financial Management Association, Grapevine (Dallas), TX. (2008).
Chen, D. Yes "The Monitoring and Advisory Functions of Corporate Boards: Theory and Evidence," Washington Area Finance Association, Washington, DC. (2008).
Chen, D., Bradley, M., Dallas, G., & Snyderwine, E. Yes "The Relation between Corporate Governance and Credit Risk, Bond Yields and Firm Valuation," Washington Area Finance Association, Washington, DC. (2008).
"Bank CEO Overconfidence and Risk-taking" (Planning)
We analyze the contribution of behavioral biases of CEOs, in particular their overconfidence to bank risk-taking.
"Board Independence, Managerial Risk-taking, and the Cost of Debt" (Writing Results)
Using Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the contemporaneous change of exchange listing standards as a natural experiment, we analyze the effect of board independence on managerial risk-taking, as well as a differential impact of board independence on the cost of debt conditional on the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders. Our results suggest that higher independence leads to CEO risk-taking, which exacerbates the conflict between shareholders and bondholders. As a result, we document a differential impact of board independence on the cost of debt depending on the expected agency costs of debt of a firm. While board independence reduces the cost of debt under the scenarios that are characterized by weak agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders, the relationship between independence and the cost of debt is reversed if the expected agency costs of debt are significant.
"Diversification or Monitoring?" (Planning)
We analyze the empirical tradeoff between diverfication of institutional funds and their corporate governance initiatives.