In the fall of 1993, after a fairly prolonged conflict between the Hutu in Rwanda, the Huto power’s, the extremist group and the Tutsi and the moderate Huto’s. There was something called the Arusha Accords, and the Arusha Accords were implemented to bring peace to Rwanda. What I hoped to come out of the book is to help move the discussion forward. I’ve sort of provided a framework for those who are interested in this sort of thing, in humanitarian intervention. To think about the moral nature of intervention and how it fits within the larger picture of international relations and even more broadly one of the themes is the role that moral principle should play in the practical liberations of the states. So when states are thinking about what they ought to do.

There’s even information being passed from inside some of Huto militia to Romeo Belair, who was lieutenant general leading the human peace keeping force. The Huto were planning a massive attack on the Tutsi population. So while you have this civil war reunited in one part of the country you have the Huto’s extremists, the militia, and many civilians engaging in mass slaughter throughout the rest of the country. The U.S. was dancing around what constituted genocide. There’s this infamous quotes by one of Clinton’s spokes people where she says, “well we’re not really sure how many acts of genocide constitutes genocide.” Now that was at the highest levels. As you get lower down the chain soldiers thought that this was just all part of some, you know, long ethnic divide between the Huto and the Tutsi, which is a myth. So my project was one to assess the extent that to which we can make any sense of that concept. States having that kind of moral claim and if we can make sense out of it does it actually imply the sort of standing that the international community thought it did. You know, sovereignty can’t stand as a bar. It can’t stand as a shield so that governments can do this sort of thing to their own people. The second step is to lay out the conditions under which the international community would be obligated to intervene. The whole point of this was to challenge what was the accepted view. Which was humanitarian intervention is not morally permissible. So I looked a Rwanda as a case where if there is ever going to be an instance where the right thing to do, where the morally correct thing to do is going to intervene, it’s going to be a case like Rwanda. And if you can’t defend an obligation to intervene in that case than you’re not likely going to be able to defend it in any other case. And I hope I’ve given a good account of why morality matters in international arena.